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CITY OF NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Ernst Craan

Complainant(s)
Complaint

-against-

Number 120J!-J64-Ef

Du Art Film Laboratories Company
Jack Laamanen, Supervisor
Arthur Nalven
Resggndentj[s].

The above-captioned case is hereby administratively closed,
pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Human Rights Comn.i ssion
of the City of New York, Rule 11 (e) , on the ground(s) that:
Public interest will not be served by further prosecution
of the complaint. The Complainant signed a release on November
22, 1983, releasing the Respondent from all claims including,
but not limited to claims of violation of all federal, state
and city laws.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 11 the Complainant
may apply in writing to the Commission as a body for the reopening. Such application shall be made within a reasonable
time and must be upon notice to all parties to the complaint.
You must address any request for a reopening to Case Control,
City Commission on Human Rights, 52 Duane Street, New York,
New York
10007.

/
Dated:
Director

Dated:
Executive Director
cc:

To Complainant(s)
Mr. Ernst Craan
62-05 84th Street, Apartment D-52
Middle Village, NY 11379
To Respondent(s)
Du Art Film Laboratories Company
245 West 55th Street
New York, NY 10036
Att:
Att:
Att:

Jack Laamanen, Supervisor
Arthur Nalven, Manager
Personnel Director

V YOKK SiVVll-: DfVlSlON Ol-1 HUilAN
on the conqilaint of

>"- is f C o h e n \,
CORRECTED DETERMINATION

CASE NO:

-againsti-Art Film Laboratories,

Inc.

IB-E-A-84-94383A

EEOC NO:

Respondent,

DETERMINATION AMD ORDER AFTER INVESTIGATION-

3~

On F e b r u a r y 7 , 1 9 8 4 , M o r r i s C o h e n , w h o w a s s i x t y f o u r ( 6 4 ) y e a r s of a g e ,
ally filed a verified complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Conroission and the
ate Division of Human Rights charging the above named respondent(s) with an unlawful
scriminatory practice relating to e m p l o y m e n t

because of his a g e ,

.olation of the Human Rights Law of the State of New York.
After investigation, the Division of Human Rights has determined that, insofar as
!Spondent(s)
; (are) concerned, there is No Probable Cause to believe that the said respondent (s)
is (have) engaged in or is (are) engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practice
xnplained of.
This determination is based on the following:
The investigation failed to reveal s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s to
credit the allegations contained in the complaint that
the complainant, was unlawful d i s c r i m i n a t e d against and
d e n i e d equal t e r m s , c o n d i t i o n s a n d p r i v i l e g e s o f e m p l o y m e n t b e c a u s e of his a g e .
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n , however, revealed t h a t the complainant
a s w e l l a s s e v e r a l o t h e r e m p l o y e e s w e r e laid o f f b y t h e
respondent for "lack of work. The respondent subsequently
hired two (2) of the l a i d - o f f employees, one of t h i r t y two ( 3 2 )
y e a r s o f a g e a n d a n o t h e r f i f t y f i v e ( 5 5 ) y e a r s o f age. T h e s e
e m p l o y e e s were r e h i r e d b e c a u s e t h e y h a d e x p e r i e n c e o n t h e
P a n e l P r i n t e r . The c o m p l a i n a n t l a c k e d t h i s e x p e r i e n c e .
It
should be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n a n t w a s h i r e d a t t h e
a g e o f s i x t y ( 6 0 ) . The r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e c o r d s h o w a c o n s i s t e n t
patern of h i r i n g employees in the f i f t y (50) and sixty (60)
y e a r s of age r a n g e .

PAGE TWO.
•I1H-: COMPLAINT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED DISMISSED ADD THE FILE IS-CLOSED.
ANY PARTY TO THIS PROCEEDING MAY APPEAL THIS ORDER TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE IN THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT EMBRACING THE COUNTY
WHEREIN TIE UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE ORDER
OCCURRED BY FILING WITH SUCH APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
A PETITION AND NOTICE OF PETITION WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS
ORDER.

THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF PETITION MUST ALSO BE SERVED ON ALL PARTIES

INCLUDING THE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

DO NOT FILE 11 IE ORIGINAL PETITION AND

NOTICE OF PETITION WITH HIE STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT A COMPLAINANT WHO SEEKS STATE JUDICIAL REVIEW,
AND WHO RECEIVES AN ADVERSE DECISION THEREIN, MAY LOSE HIS OR HER RIGHT TO
PROCEED SUBSEQUENTLY IN FEDERAL COURT UNDER TITLE VII, BY VIRTUE OF KREMER V.
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CO.,456 U.S. 461 (1982).

" ,FEB l •
STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

jfhwuujMt^

ARMANDO s. MAHTJNEZ
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
TO:

Mr. Morris Cohen
2068 East 54th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11234

Complainant

Polette Freidin Prashker and Ga?tli?ndent
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Att;

Eric Rosenfeld, Esq.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In the Matter of tho Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD
and
DuArt Film Laboratories
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract in assigning positive work to negative developers rather
than calling in positive developers to perform
such work? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 23, 1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It is the Union's claim that unless positive developers
refuse to accept positive developing work on overtime or call-in,
the Company may not involuntarily assign positive developing to
negative developers.
Though the Union introduced evidence of a past practice
supportive of its position, the actual contract language and
arbitral contract interpretation sustain.- the Company's action.
/'Section 13 of the contract expressly provides for temporary
transfers between different classifications.

I am satisfied that

the assignments involved in this case, which took place on four
or five days in April were of a duration and quantity to constitut
temporary transfers within the meaning of Section 13.

Though a

positive developer had been laid off sometime prior to the
disputed assignments, I cannot conclude from the record tfiat these
particular assignments "deprive(d) another employee of actual
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employment or full employment
13(a).

within the meaning of Section

Indeed, insufficient probative evidence was offered by

the Union on this last point.

However, the Company is cautioned

that it would be improper to lay off employees' in anticipation
of covering the fulltime work vacated by the lay off, by temporary
transfers.

I would consider that violative of the final pro-

vision of Section 13(a).

But a proximate causation between the

earlier layoff of a positive developer in this case and the
subsequent assignment of negative developers to positive work
over the few days involved, has not been shown..,
Moreover, t h i s issue had been considered and decided by a
prior industry arbitrator.
of October 4, 1966

Arbitrator McMahon, in his Award

in the matter of the arbitration between

Mecca Film Laboratories and Local 702 I.A.T.S.E., interpreted
Section 13 of the contract, and held that:
"The Company has the right under Article 13
of the collective bargaining agreement, to
require negative develope'rs to do positive
developing and positive developers to do
negative developing."
The Article 13 referred to by Arbitrator McMahon is the same
as presently found in the contract between the parties to this
arbitration.

Since the McMahon Award, not only has there been

no change in Article (Section 13) but the effect of the McMahon
decision has not been nullified or changed by the several industry
wide contract negotiations that have taken place since then.

As

now, the contract between the Union and Mecca was the industry
wide contract; hence the industry arbitrator's interpretation
and decision is applicable industry-wide.

I subscribe to the

well settled rule that prior arbitration decisions covering the
same issue or substantive dispute should not be lightly reversed
or set aside by a subsequent arbitrator.

Obviously, I do not find

that Arbitrator McMahon was "palpably wrong."

-3-

With the contract language clear and unambiguously

inter-

preted by a prior arbitration decision, any practice to the contrary is immaterial as precedent for this case.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard tlio proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not v i o l a t e the contract in
assigning positive work to negative developers rather than calling in positive developers to perform such work.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: June 19, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Award.

1)
"

fl

T-U1
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration :
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
and

AWARD

Technicolor, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Permanent Arbitrator
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The Company's claim for damages arising
out of an alleged Union interference with
the Company's efforts to operate the new
Black and White Positive-Negative Processing Machine with a crew complement of two
operators, is denied.
Interference has not been proved. The Company did not order the operators to work
the machine as the Company wanted. The Union
was not put to the test. The Company decided
not to require operation of the machine with
two operators, acceding instead to the Union's
objection to the complement, subject to this
arbitration. The Company had the right to
require operation of the machine as it wanted,
subject to the Union's and employee's rights
to grieve. But because the Company did not
press this right to the point of determining
if the employees would work as ordered and
then grieve, I cannot find "interference" or
actionable Union and/or employee defiance.

2.

Under Section 17(c) of the contract, and
based on comparability with other reasonably related machines, I am persuaded that
the third operator is needed primarily for
relief when the machine is run continuously,
but is not needed when the machine operation
is non-continuous. Therefore the complement
for the new B&W Developing Machine may be two
when operated non-continuously, and shall be
three when operated continuously.

Eric Jf. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
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DATED: June 19, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss

I, Eric J. Sclimertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
arbitrator that I nin the i n d i v i d u a l described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

u,/

?7y-f 1-VTX7
-

-en

/

OZ^TP-A T2-?--? --X)/
Cx^

S8ptember 19, 1975

Mr. Chuck
Local 702
165 W. 46
New York,

¥itello
I.A.T.S.E.
St., Rm. 1405
N. Y. 10036

Dear Chuck:
In our meeting of September 17, 1975 held in my office, a
discussion developed concerning a piece of printing equipment
which Du Art installed and which has become an issue between
the union and Du Art Film Laboratories. This machine is a
Research Products printing machine which we installed for the
purpose of improving the quality of the product we were
manufacturing on other type printers. This piece of equipment
does not do any type of work which we were not capable of
doing or have not done before with our older type equipment,
nor does this machine give us any increased productivity.
In fact, it is probably the slowest piece of printing equipment
in operation in our laboratory. This printer uses some
advanced technology, thus enabling us to print in a white light
area and produces, we feel, a better motion picture product
which will make us more competitive. If, in the future, this
machine is ever modified by adding additional cameras in order
to do "creative optical work", the type which is now done in
Optical Hotue*. we will notify you of this change and will discuss
this operation with you at that time. I understand the basis of
this letter i» for. your withdrawing the pending arbitration
concerning this machine. Thanking you in advance for your
consideration in this matter, I remain,
Very truly yours,

sbert M. Smith
Executive Vice President
RMS:amr

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Technicolor, Inc.

The issue in dispute involves the employment of Alan -M. Kitz. i

A hearing was held on October 23, 1985 at which time Mr. Kitz, i
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

i

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

i
j

The parties filed post-hearing briefs or statements.

Based on the "Interview for Employment" form, Union Exhibit
#1, and the "remarks" thereon, "Temporary - starts/9-20-85 days", .
written by the Employer's Vice-President, together with the regular
practices of the industry regarding said "employment" forms, I am
satisfied that the grievant was hired by the Employer, and that a
mutual agreement of employment was entered into.
That the Employer did not know that the grievant was a member
of the Union's bargaining team

and that those duties might inter-

fere with at least thirty days of uninterrupted work for the Employer, at a time when such work schedule as a Timer was very
important to the Employer, is as much the fault of the Employer
as that of the grievant.

In my view, the Employer had as much an

opportunity and duty to ask the grievant when he was interviewed
about any role he might have had with the Union's bargaining team,
as the grievant had the duty to disclose any such position.

As I

see it, the fact is that the Employer thought of or learned of
this possible conflict of time between the productivity needed in
the Timer's job and the grievant1s role as a Union negotiator after

-2-

the grievant was hired.

Therefore the Company's insistence that

the grievant and/or the Union give assurances that the grievant
would give at least 30 days of uninterrupted work as a Timer or
make up any

interrupted periods by overtime, cannot be construed

as conditions precedent to the grievant's employment.

Therefore,

no matter how reasonable or realistic the Employer's request were
in those connections, the hiring of the grievant was not "dependent
upon his or the Union's response.

Therefore though he and the

Union did not give the Employer the assurance it sought, the Employer had no right to claim that it would not hire the grievant
or commence his employment on September 20th.

The employment

"contract" had previously been made.
Moreover, though I understand and appreciate why the Employer
wanted assurances of at least 30 days work, or an overtime

agree-

ment to make up work interrupted by contract negotiations, I am
not persuaded that the Employer had any real and present basis for
!

requiring any such assurances at the time the grievant was to start
work.

At the time, no contract negotiation sessions were sched-

uled.

Neither the grievant nor the Union

meetings would take place.
speculative at the time.

knew when any such

Indeed, the Employer's concern was

Other circumstances were possible.

First

subsequently scheduled meetings might have been few, if at all,
during the critical 30 day period.

Second, any subsequent sched-

ule when arranged, could and should have been the point and basis
for an arrangement between the parties to achieve an acceptable
balance between the grievant's duties as a Timer and his role with
the Union bargaining team.

And thirdly, when and if any subse-

quently scheduled meetings unreasonably interfered with the
grievant's duties as a Timer, and if the parties were unable then
to work out an acceptable accommodation, the contract would provide
the answer.

Apparently, such a circumstance was contemplated when

-3-

the parties negotiated Section 28 of the collective bargaining
agreement.
I recognize how the application of Section 28 might disrupt
the Employer's plans in this case in connection with what it
needed and expected from the Timer.

But, once unconditionally

hired as the grievant was, the Employer is thereafter bound to
the terms of the contract regarding "absence from service of the
Employer because of "any Union office or position."

The Employer

cannot, after the fact, circumvent the contract provision on that
point by refusing to put to work a person it hired

after it

learns that that person may exercise his Section 28 contract rights
Under the facts of this case, and holding as I have that the
Employer

had as much responsibility

to ask or learn about the

grievant's role as a Union negotiator as he had to volunteer that i
information, I must conclude that the grievant was denied implementation of the agreement to hire him

because of his position

as a member of the Union's negotiating team, and that such denial
constituted a "deprivation of employment ...because of Union
membership" in violation of Section 2 of the contract.

That the

denial was not based on anti-union animus is no less a contract
violation.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons, the grievant
should have been put to work as a Timer,
beginning September 20, 1985, and was entitled to the temporary period of employment for which he was hired. The Employer
shall make him whole for his lost wages
during the period involved.

DATED: November 18, 1985
STATE OF New York )„_
.
OO • •
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric JT Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

!

Date.
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS
165 W. 46th ST.

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

ROOM *W

^JW-5540

INTERVIEW FOR EMPLOYMENT

to
Address
- J.- -^

Applying at

•

Signature of Applicant
Remarks
'

X

Local No. 702, IA.TS.E.
NOTE? APPUCANTS MUST RETURN TO THIS OFFICE AFTER INTERVIEW.

f-

^'' 1 --••;:'•.-?
~ - L

"i

-?•«.•• -. _ . / «

I M-

E R I C J. S C H M E R T Z

P. C.
HOFSTBA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL or LAW
HEMPSTEAO, NEW YORK nsso
(SIS) S 6 O - 5 S 5 4

February 3, 1986

Everitt E. Lewis, Esq.
Lewis, Greenwald, Kennedy
& Lewis, P. C.
232 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
Bonnie Glatzer, Esq.
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather
& Geraldson
520 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
RE: Local 702 -and- Technicolor
Kitz Arbitration

•

Dear Mr. Lewis and Ms. Glatzer:
You have submitted to me, respectively, letters dated
December 23, 1985 and January 2, 1986 in which you set forth certain
disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of my
Award of November 18, 1985. You have asked me for clarification of
the Award and/or determinations on the disagreements.
To the extent that I am able, considering the scope of what
was presented to me in the arbitration, I do so as follows:
1. Had Mr. Kitz been actively employed following
his "hire," he would have begun work on September
20, 1985. I assume he would have completed the
temporary assignment on November 22, 1985 and that
Mr. Goldstein worked longer only because he started
later.
Therefore payment to Kitz for the period September
20, 1985 to November 22, 1985 was proper.
2. There was nothing in the record before me showing
how many days Kitz attended Trustee meetings and
negotiation sessions. Your respective letters are not
of evidentiary value on this point, nor is the letter
of November 22, 1985 from Mr. Norman Stein.
What is important is not how many meetings he attended, but for how many of those meetings or negotiations
he was paid. On this point, and in the absence of any
other probative evidence, I accept Kitz's affidavit
<v
under oath that he was paid for only six such meetings

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

and negotiations. Therefore, six days should
have been deducted from the payment to him that
my Award ordered. The Company shall make the
adjustment.
3. The question of deduction or non-deduction
of unemployment insurance also was not presented
to me or argued at the arbitration hearing. But
it is relevent to the damages I directed. Had I
been asked to rule on that matter in my Award, I
would have directed the Company not to deduct unemployment insurance, but rather to notify the unemployment insurance department of the arbitration
Award, and request that department to recoup the
appropriate amount of insurance payments from Kitz,
and to adjust the Company's experience rating accordingly. As this has been my consistent practice in
back pay situations in which I am asked to rule on
the unemployment insurance question, I make that
practice my ruling in this case. The Company shall
restore the amount of deducted unemployment insurance
to Kitz's payment.
4. No requests for pro-rata vacation pay or for
two weeks wages in lieu of notice of layoff were
requested in the arbitration For that reason and
because I am not persuaded that a planned, short
period of employment to cover work on a temporary
basis carries with it any right to pro-rata vacation
or pay in lieu of notice of layoff, the Union's requests for these two benefits are denied.
5. The tax deductions made by the Company were not
improper and may stand.
Very^-fcAruly yours,

Eric/a. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hl

i

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

2
RAFAEL SALINAS,

3
Plaintiff,

4
v.

84 Civ. 9180 GLG

5
6
7

DUART FILM LABORATORIES, INC.
MOTION PICTURE LABOATORY
TECHNICIANS, LOCAL 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO,
Defendants.

8
9
10

January 15, 1986
10:00 a.m.

11
12

Before:
13

HON. GERALD L. GOETTEL
14

District Judge
15
16

APPEARANCES

17

RAFAEL SALINAS, Pro Se

18

ERIC ROSENFELD
Attorney for Defendant Duart

19
20

NICHOLAS F. LEWIS
Attorney for defendant Motion Picture
Laboratory Technicians

21
22
23
24
25

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S.

COURTHOUSE

• FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791-1020

153
1

2
3

Rafael Salinas
v.

84 Civ. 9180

Duart Film Laboratories, Inc., et al.

4

January 16, 1986

5

10:00

6

(Trial resumed)

7

(In open court; jury present)

8

THE COURT:

9
10

a.m.

Mr. Salinas, have you been able to

obtain the attendance of the two witnesses you wish to
produce?

11

MR. SALINAS:

Your Honor, last night I called

12

them and only I can get contact with one but they told me

13

they have trouble to get over here because they have

14

permission from the job.

15

I went this morning for asking permission to

16

have them and the boss told me I don't have the papers.

17

Last night I can't get the papers downstairs because it was

18

too late, 5 o'clock.

19

card, I was this morning -- card, he cannot give permission

20

because he is working and the other one is working

21

midnights.

22

He says he is able to come but he don't sleep last night,

23

was working.

24

me to produce them later because

25

THE COURT:

So he told me they would give me the

I called last night and this morning I called.

So he is unable to come.

So maybe you give

—

The case is ending today, Mr.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791-1020

Charge

265

1

Swear the marshal, Mary.

2

(A marshal was sworn)

3

(Jury commenced deliberations at 1:40

4

(3:05

5

(In open court, jury present)

6

THE COURT:

7

p.m.)

p.m.)

Would you take the attendance of the

jury, please.

8

(Jury attendance taken and all were present)

9

THE CLERK:

10

Madam foreman, has the jury agreed

upon a verdict?

11

THE FOREPERSON: Yes.

12

THE CLERK:

13

THE FOREPERSON:

14
15

How do you find?
Yes, we have reached a decision

in favor of the defendants.
THE CLERK:

Members of the jury, listen to yo-jr

16

verdict as it now stands recorded.

17

the defendant.

You say you find for

18

(Jury polled and all answered

19

THE COURT:

in the affirmative)

All right, members of the jury, I

20

usually do not tell jurors whether I agree or disagree with

21

their verdict because it is not really any of my business,

22

well, whether I agree with you or not is unimportant.

23

In this particular instance, however, there was

24

a serious question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled

25

to a jury in this case.

The defendants decided the day

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791-1020

Charge

266

1

before the trial started that he shouldn't have been and

2

made a motion to strike the jury.

3

be considered.

4

decide this case myself and I want to tell you that I agree

5

completely with your verdict.

it came on too late to

And so that I very possibly would have to

6

While you can probably make an argument as to

7

who was responsible for the damage that was done to the -

8

film, I think it abundantly clear that nothing that

9

occurred thereafter occurred because the plaintiff is

10

Colombian.

11

anything to do with the disputes that occurred

12

or the failure to reach an agreement concerning the

13

disputes.

14

I don't see his national origin as having had
thereafter

I think that the union was very active in

15

attempting to get the best deal they could and they finally

16

negotiated a pretty good deal for him where he lost only a

17

little pay and he would get his 15 percent differential

18

working the day shift and he decided not to take that deal.

19

That was his decision and I don't think that any of the

20

defendants did anything because of his Colombian

21

nationality.

22

All right, report to the jury clerk, I think

23

some of you are on your second week of service so you will

24

probably be excused as soon as you go down.

25

thank you again for your deliberations in the matter.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791-1020

I want to

Charge

1

(Jury excused)

2

THE COURT:

3

267

Mark the jury verdict as a court

exhibit.

4

Mr. Salinas, you have 10 days in which to set

5

aside the jury verdict in writing.

6

appeal from the judgment in the case as soon as one is

7

filed.

8

to enter judgment for them one or the other.

9

You also can take an

The defendants will enter judgment or ask the clerk

MR. ROSENFELD:

Your Honor, Defendant Duart

10

intends to make an application which we'll either do now on

11

the record or in writing as you prefer for attorney fees

12

under the Supreme Court

—

13

THE COURT:

I thought you were going to do that.

14

MR. ROSENFELD:

15

We have been saying from the
•
commencement of the case we intended to do that because

16

what we considered the nature of the action.

17

THE COURT:

I have to say if he had been

18

represented by counsel all the way through but the fact

19

that he has proceeded for the last few months pro se, puts

20

it in a somewhat different light because the basis —

21

there are two bases for attorney fees.

22

which is addressed to pleadings and things of that nature

23

and to the extent it is designed to control attorneys'

24

vexatious pleadings.

25

of this case some months ago so it can't be considered as

well,

One is Rule 11,

The attorney wisely got himself out
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against him.

2

The alternate basis for looking to attorney's

3

fees here is the civil rights act which does provide for

4

attorney's fees for the prevailing party, not the civil

5

rights act, the employment discrimination act.

6

shadings of differences in that regard between the various

7

acts dealing with race, sex, age and so on and I don't off

8

the top of my head recall specifically how they are with

9

respect to national origin cases, but I do know that in all

There are

10

of them there is almost a presumption against giving a

11

prevailing defendant an attorney's fee unless they can show

12

an extreme case.

13

MR. LEWIS:

I will also make a motion but I will

14

make it under Rule 63 or 61.

15

to Mr. Salinas many months ago which he rejected and I

16

think under the recentsent Supreme Court case on that rule

17

we are entitled to our costs including, I believe,

18

attorney's fees since the date of the offer of judgment was

19

made.

20

THE COURT:

We made an offer of judgment

You get all costs as part of your

21

judgment in any event.

22

fees since you made it.

23

if it was a good faith offer and judgment if he declined it,

24
25

You are talking about attorney's
I think you are entitled to that

Well, in any event you have got to make your
motions in writing.

I will rule on them.
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1

MR. LEWIS:

Thank you, your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

I think you have got a difficult

3

legal issue.

The Eastway case said in the context of an

4

attorney that subjective good faith would not excuse his

5

error.

6

faith of a pro se litigant.

7

conceded

8

against.

9

you said he was just clearly wrong.

There's been no rulings about the subjective good

that he believes that he was being discriminated
So you have, in effect, conceded good faith, but

MR. LEWIS:

10

In your closing argument you

Let me review that, your Honor.

11

Maybe I will change my position when I review the cases

12

again.

13

MR. ROSENFELD:

Not to prolong the discussions,

14

but the various theories under which the court awarded

15

attorney fees in the Steinberg St. Regis case and

16

apportioned it, as you know, between the attorney and the

17

plaintiff, also in our view afford a basis for this kind of

18

relief against the pro se plaintiff.

19

THE COURT:

I am quite aware of it.

20

MR. ROSENFELD:

21

MR. LEWIS:

22

(Record closed)

We shall make our motion.

Thank you, your Honor.

23
24
25
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SUPREME COURT

: NEW YORK COUNTY

SPECIAL TERM

: PART I

ERNST CRAAN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

Index No. 24173/85

DU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC.,

CiTV'X F~"V ,'
- \D BAER, JR.:
Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss this declara 4 --y

APR I '3 ;nSn

judgment action as barred by the statute of limitations.

On July 8, 1983, plaintiff was terminated froWt&s jotf^&i'a panel printer.
The dismissal was the subject of an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the col~.~~zi.ve.
bargaining agreement between plaintiff's employer and union.

The parties entered intc

a settlement on November 22, 1983, which called for a cash payment to the p l a i - i i f f
and stated that the plaintiff released the company from "all claims including •.-.not limited to claims of violations of all Federal, State and City laws, (the " ^reemt
Plaintiff allegedly cashed the company's check and thereafter cer.ra^-...ad
an employment discrimination proceeding with the City Commission on Human Ria,h-.i_
('the Commission").

On January 31, 1985, plaintiff's case was closed by the? •_• —is.si,

on the ground that the public interest would not be served by further proseu-.:t . •-. of
Che complaint since the complainant had signed the above-mentioned Agreement.
April 19j_J.985, the chairman of the Commission affirmed the order of closure.

T:.A

order stated that the Commission's mandate does not give it authority to ad juc.-.ace
the factual issues regarding the release in the Agreement.
states that the "case is subject to

r e o p e n i n g

if

Furthermore, the v--.sr
a

c o u r t

;f

competent jurisdiction finds that the release does not preclude the Commissior from
entertaining the complaint".

-I-

On August 5, 1985, plaintiff commenced the Instant action seeking a
judgment declaring that the Agreement does not preclude plaintiff from raising the
discrimination claim.
Plaintiff urges that he was fired because he is middle-aged and Haitian,
which point was never raised in the arbitration hearing and hot subject to the
release in the Agreement.
Defendant asserts that the remedy available to plaintiff was to commence
an Article 78 proceeding within 30 days of the Commission's order affirming closure
of plaintiff's case.

Defendant contends that plaintiff's "declaratory

judgment"

action is really an appeal of the Commission's order, which is therefore barred by
the 30-day statute of limitations.

Furthermore, the fact that this action was

commenced as one for declaratory relief cannot extend the time limitation within
which the action must have been brought.
The CPLR contains no general limitations provision for a declaratory
.judgment action. To determine whether a time limitation exists for a declaratory
judgment action, the court must examine the substance of the underlying action.

If

the right of the parties sought to be clarified in the declaratory judgment action
•
are or were open to resolution by way of a separate proceeding for which a specific
limitation period is statutorily mandated, the statutory period governs and the
six-year catch-all limitation of CPLR 213(1) does not apply.
49 NY2d 230, 425 NYS2d 68 (1980).

Solnick v. Whalen.

Furthermore, if the period for invoking

the

alternate remedy has expired before the commencement of the declaratory judgment
Action,"The tatter is time barred.
Turning to the case at bar, the Commission's order closing plaintiff's
discrimination case was based on the broad release contained in the Agreement. The
procedure for review of determinations of the City Commission on Human Rights is
expressly provided for by Administrative Code sec. Bl-9.0, and must be commenced
within 30 days.

Therefore, plaintiff's failure to commence this declaratory

judgment action within the 30 days of the January 31 or April 19, 1985, decisions

-2-

bars this action.

ee Solnick v. Whalen, supra.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

DATED:

APRIL

1986

FILED
MAY - 21386
• COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
RAFAEL SALINAS,

:
Plaintiff,

:
84 Civ. 9180

-against-

(GLG)

:
M E M O R A N D U M

DU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC., and
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS,
LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO,
Defendants.

:
P.HCI.SI.ON
:
:

Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants,
they move for the assessment of attorneys' fees under both 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This was an employment discrimination case brought
by plaintiff against his employer and his union claiming that
both were discriminating against him because he was born in
Colombia

(as were a number of other members of the union and

employees of the employer).

The plaintiff was disciplined at

his work because of his negligence which caused his employer a
substantial sum of money.

His union intervened and ultimately

obtained for him a reduction of the disciplinary sanction to a
relatively insignificant amount.

He rejected this discipline

and commenced this suit, through counsel, after obtaining his
right to sue letter from the EEOC.

Plaintiff's counsel main-

tains he commenced this suit after determining that there was
reason to believe that plaintiff's union had not adequately

MAY 0 3 1986

represented him on earlier occasions.

(There were explana-

tions for this which later came to light.) As to the claim of
national origin discrimination, counsel states that he had to
proceed upon the plaintiff's claims that this existed since
absent discovery he would be unable to determine the accuracy
or inaccuracy of this claim.
After discovery had proceeded for some period of
time, the plaintiff's counsel determined that he could
prove an employment discrimination case.

not

He negotiated a

small settlement with the defendants and recommended to his
client that he take it.

The plaintiff refused.

His attorney

advised him of the possibility of having to pay the prevailing
party's

attorney's

fees

in

an

unsuccessful

result.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff persisted.

The attorney

then withdrew.

the

event

of

•

The case was tried before a jury with plaintiff proceeding pro se.

The jury had little difficulty in returning a

verdict for the defendants.

While some of the plaintiff's

grievances against his employer and his union over a period of
time may have had some basis, they were not caused by his
Colombian national origin.

Moreover, as to the

particular

incident giving rise to the termination of the plaintiff's
employment, the evidence was quite clear that he was at fault
and that his negligence resulted in a substantial loss to his
employer.

His union was quite vigorous in obtaining for him

reinstatement with little loss which he unwisely refused to
accept.

This leads us to the application for attorney's fees
against both the previous attorney and the plaintiff himself.
The first issue is whether we should assess attorney's fees
against the former attorney.
where

We start with the belief that

defendants prevail attorney's

fees

under the Civil

Rights Act should not be assessed unless a court finds that
the claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that
the plaintiff continued

to litigate after

this became

ap-

parent.

Christenburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422

(1978).

In this instance, we believe it became apparent to

the attorney midway through the litigation that his client had
no claim.

However, since he withdrew at that point, this is

not grounds for assessing

attorney's fees against him.

issue under Rule 11, however, is somewhat closer.

The

He was on

the borderline of not making an adequate investigation before
commencing the litigation.
upon

However, he states that he relied

the client's statements

limited

time

in which

to

to him, that he had

commence

a very

litigation before

the

statute of limitations ran, and other claims were not demonstrated false until later.

Considering all of this, we be-

lieve the assessment of attorney's fees against him would be
improper.
The claim against the plaintiff stands on a somewhat
different footing.

He made the claims to his counsel which

proved to be baseless.
attorney

He continued

the litigation after his

warned him that he had no case and that he

faced

attorney's fees if he pursued the litigation.

Consequently,

the case went all the way to trial with a considerable expenditure of defendant's attorney's fees and the time of the
Court.
In this regard, two claims made by the union's attorney must be dispelled. He claims that he raised the possibility of making a summary judgment motion early in the case
and that the Court advised him that it "would not consider any
such motion in discrimination law cases."

Attorney's Affi-

davit at 2. This Court made no such statement. He was merely
advised that the authorities in this Circuit made it very dif. ficult to grant a summary judgment in an employment discrimination case of this sort.

(Curiously, summary judgments are

routinely upheld in age discrimination cases but not national
origin ones.) The union's lawyer also states that this Court
advised him at the conclusion of the plaintiff's direct case
that it could not grant a directed verdict since "this Court
took the position that Second Circuit precedent precluded the
granting of a motion for a directed verdict in Title VII
cases...."

Attorney's Affidavit at 3.

What counsel was

actually told was that this Circuit's Court of Appeals has
counseled against granting directed verdicts, except where the
defense case may be quite long, and recommends allowing the
case to go to the jury, reserving the possibility of setting
aside the jury's

verdict if wrong.

unique to Title VII cases.

This approach is not

The only unusual aspect in considering an award of
attorney's fees against the plaintiff personally
that the defendants concede

is the fact

that he sincerely believed his

claim that he had been discriminated against because he was a
Colombian.

It appears that this belief stemmed at least part-

ly from a mistaken impression that the EEOC's supplying of a
"right to sue" letter was their endorsement that his claim had
merit.

It is undeniable, however, that his attorney advised

him to the contrary and warned him of the consequences if he
continued.

Consequently, we conclude

that an award of at-

torney's fees against him is appropriate despite his earnestness.
The only remaining question
torney's fees should be assessed

is for what period at-

and in what amount.

Under

the circumstances described above, we believe that the fees
should be computed only from the point when the original attorney withdrew.
neys seek.)
attorney's

(Indeed, this is all the employer's attor-

We, consequently,
fees

assess against the plaintiff

in the amount of $5,000.00 in favor of the

employer, DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc., and attorney's fees
in the amount of $3,542.50 for the Local 702.
assessed

jointly

under

These fees are

the Civil Rights Act

Defendants will enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, N.Y.
May / , 1986
GERARD
U.S.D.J.
-5-

and Rule

11.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T..S.E.

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Technicolor, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Has the Employer violated Sections 7, 13
or 17 of the collective bargaining agreement on or about May 6, 1986 resulting in
the layoff of Louise Chirichella? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 1, 1986 at which time Ms.
Chirichella, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The record clearly establishes that the work of "notching" and "writing numbers and notations" has been a regular duty
performed by the Timers as well as the Timer/Clerk.

Though the

Timer/Clerk does only this work, it has not been work exclusive
to her classification.

On the night shift where there has never

been a Timer/Clerk, the "notching" and "recording of numbers"
has always been done by the night shift Timers as part of their
regular functions.

On the day shift, the Timers have regularly

performed those duties as well, but because until recently they
were busy with other regular duties of the Timer classification,
some of the "notching" work and the recording of numbers has been
handled as well on a full-time basis by the Timer/Clerk.
The Employer has shown a substantial reduction in its
business and production, and specifically a substantial reduction
in Timer's work.

Indeed, the complement of

duced to two on days, and two on nights.

Timers has been re-

With f-h<=
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1

the Timers are able now to handle all the "notching" and "number
recording" required of and attendant to their Timer job.

The

work of the Timer/Clerk, as an adjunct to the Timers on the day
shift, is no longer needed.

The Employer has shown that there

is not enough "notching" and/or "number recording" work to keep
a Timer/Clerk

fully or substantially occupied.

In fact, recently,

while one day shift Timer has been away, all the available Timer
work, including the "notching" and "number recording" has been
adequately handled by a single day shift Timer.

;

Accordingly I find that the grievant was properly laid
off for lack of work under Section 7 of- the contract, and that
her layoff did not violate Sections 13 or 17.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:

!

The Employer did not violate the contract
in the layoff of Louise Chirichella.
X"
-Eric Jr. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: July 7, 1986
STATE OF New York ) _3_3 •. •
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

'/ '

- •

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
Local 102, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
And
Technicolor, Inc.

The ruling of the Local 702 Executive Board referred to in this
case regarding the hiring of temporary employees is not part of
the collective bargaining agreement and is not binding on the
company.
Therefore, the union was in error when it requested the company
to terminate Mr. Salvatore because of said executive board ruling.
Because the company has the right to hire temporary employees, the
company may re-employee Mr. Salvatore for the temporary period
for which he was hired.
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LAY-OFF
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LAY-OFF
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

Technicolor, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Robert DiBari? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 19, 1986 at which time Mr.
DiBari, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharged for unsatisfactory attendance,
following the progressive discipline steps of warnings and suspension .
There is no question about the unsatisfactory nature of
the grievant's record.

In 1985 he was absent twenty-six days and

his pattern of absenteeism continued following a seven day suspension that year.

In 1986, up to his discharge in November, he

had been absent fifteen days, many of which followed a warning.
Particularly objectionable to the Employer has been the
/
grievant's pattern of "taking long weekends" by staying out on
Mondays or Fridays and by "extending" holidays.

The Employer finds

this particularly burdensome because with many employees on layoff
due to difficult economic conditions for the industry, the grievant's absences on the busy days of Monday and Fridays taxes the
available personnel and often requires a supervisor to fill in

-2-

(the grievant's job was as a can carrier).

The latter generates

Union complaints.
Based on the record I conclude that the grievant's record,
especially comparing 1986 with 1985 shows improvement and that with
ten permitted days off under the contract (seven sick days and
three personal leave days) the grievant's fifteen absences in 1986
constitute an unacceptable record.

But it is not so bad (i.e. five

more than contractually permitted) as to justify his discharge,
particularly in view of the fact that he was not fired following
his 1985 suspension but warned again in 1986,

thereby restarting

the progressive discipline cycle.
Apparently, moreover, the grievant did not hide the fact
that he took extended weekends to stay with his elderly mother on
Long Island, particularly after his brother's death.

Though he

was wrong in doing so, I am constrained to believe that he may
have thought that with notice to the Employer (usually towards the
end of the weekend) it was all right or excused.
Under the foregoing circumstance I think it proper and
appropriate that the grievant be given one final chance to maintain a satisfactory attendance record.

He should be disciplined

by a- suspension, and he is expressly warned that he will be subject to discharge if his attendance record does not improve forthwith to a satisfactory level and that it be so maintained.
Additionally, I shall^enjoin him from taking extended
weekends or holidays to stay with his mother.

As understandable

as his desire to do so may be, he will just have to make other
arrangements.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
*

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:

-3-

The discharge of Robert DiBari is reduced
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated
without back pay and the period of time
between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for his unsatisfactory attendance
record. DiBari is warned that this is
his final change. If his absenteeism
record continues unsatisfactory, he shall
be subject to discharge. Additionally,
he is enjoined from taking extended
weekends or extended holidays to visit
and stay with his mother.

Eric xJ.' Schmertz
Arbi/trator.
DATED: December 22, 1986
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration:
between
:
Local 702, I. A. T. S. E.
and
Technicolor, Inc.

:
:
'

OPINION

AND

AWARD

t-ffi

The stipulated issue is:
Whether an increase in nagative developing
speed from 100 to 125 feet per minute requires an increase in the rate under Article
17c of the contract? If so what shall be the
increase?
A hearing was held on June 24, 1987 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examinte witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
I am persuaded that there should be some increase in the
rate, attendant to the increase in speed from 100 to 125 feet
per minute.

It is undisputed that the increase in speed will in-

crease productivity and/or the Employer's capability for greater
productivity.

Based on equitable considerations as well as

relevant practice, the employees should benefit monetarily in
the increased productivity capability, even if the increased speed
does not require greater skills, abilities or effort.
Relevant in my judgment is that after the machine speed was
increased in 1981 from 50 to 100 feet per minute, the parties
negotiated a rate increase of an additional 10% and $10 a week.
I am not convinced that increased productivity was not a factor
considered in negotiating that rate increase, though I recognize
that other factors were relied on as well.
Accordingly I take arbitral notice of the Employer's offer
in negotiating under Article 17c of the contract in this dispute
to increase the rate by what I deem to have been 2%% and $2.50
a week, despite the withdrawal of that offer at the arbitration.

-2-

In those negotiations and at the arbitration hearing the
Union demanded a rate increase of 5% and $5.00.
Both of the aforesaid positions are based on arithmetic
theories and formulas founded on different premises.

Both theorie

and premises are logical and mathematically supportable. Hence
the jusification for an equitable resolution and reconciliation
of the two.
Appropriate under the circumstances and I believe reasonable, is to fix a rate increase halfway between the Employer's
offer and the Union's demand.
Therefore, the Undersigned, Industry Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties makes the following
AWARD:
An increase in negative developing speed from
100 to 125 feet per minute requires an increase
in the rate under Article 17c of the contract.
The rate shall be increased by 3.75% and $3.75
a week.

Erio^u. Schmertz
Industry Arbitrator
DATED: July 20, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss.
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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Privileged and Confidential
Mr. Elio Pesato
Vice President - Laboratory Operations
Technicolor, Inc.
321 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036

Re:

Local 702, IATSE and Technicolor, Inc.
(Negative Developing Speed Increase and Rate)

Dear Elio:
As discussed, enclosed are copies of Arbitrator Schmertz's
Award and bill for services in the captioned matter. As you
can see, as a result of this Award, any time the Company makes
an offer under Art. 17(c), it may come into evidence at a
subsequent arbitration, and become the "floor".for the
Arbitrator's award as happened in this case. Accordingly, any
such offers the Company makes must take into account this risk.
Quite frankly, I believe Arbitrator Schmertz has done the
parties a serious disservice by "chilling" their future
negotiations via this Award. Per your suggestion, I will write
to Arbitrator Schmertz and express this thought, unless Eric
Rosenfeld believes such a letter would be unwise.
As always, should you have any further questions or
comments concerning this matter, please call.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
SEYFARTH SHAW FAIRWEATHER
GERALDSON

By
Bonnie Glatzer

BG: f j

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
- and - LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION

and

AND

AWARD

Du Art Film Laboratories

The stipulated issues are:
1.

Did the Company, in effecting layoffs in the
negative workers department violate the collective bargaining agreement by laying off
Lisa Chrystal and retaining Robert Mathias,
a less senior employee? If so, what shall be
the remedy?

2.

Did the Union violate Article 15 by posting
a certain notice on July 20, 1987 and by taking other related actions? If so, what shall
be the remedy?

A hearing was held on August 7, 1987, at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
ISSUE NO. 1
I find no need to decide whether the enumerated
jobs or functions set forth on page 43 of the contract under the heading Negative Workers Department
are separate classifications, or a single classification of a negative worker with different duties at
differing rates of pay.
Also, I need not decide whether the contract or
past practice relating to whether layoffs are by
seniority within a department or within a classification.
The disagreements between the parties on these
matters are pre-empted, in my view, by the undisputed operational and business needs of the Employer in this particular circumstance.
The undisputed facts show that Robert Mathias
was capable of and performed duties under category
(e), negative cutting and matching as well as work
under category (b) as a negative worker. And that
the grievant, Lisa Chrystal, was not capable of

-2performing the duties under category (e) and
was confined to the work of a general negative
worker under category (b).
The record also establishes, significantly,
that the Employer experienced a fall-off in the
work performed by general negative workers but
that negative cutting and matching work remained.
In the absence of a specific contract provision
requiring layoffs strictly on a seniority basis,
without any consideration of "ability," I deem it
axiomatic that where a junior employee is laid
off, the retained senior employee(s) must be able
to perform the remaining available work.

^

Here, there is no such contract provision. Indeed Section 7(a) of the contract requiring rotation of the available work amongst qualified employees within the classification affected, when
less than a full weeks work is not available, confirms that principle, and I deem that Section (c)
(1) is founded on the same principle.
In short, in both reduced workweek situations,
and in layoffs because of reduced work, coverage
of the available work by qualified employees is
mandated, and reductions in force are made in
classifications or duties where the work has fallen
off.
The Union's reliance on a past practice to the
contrary is not controlling. It has net been shown
that i'n those instances, where the junior employee
in a department was excessed, the remaining available work could not be performed by the retained,
senior employees.
But in the instant case, had Mathias been laid
off and the grievant retained, the available work
of negative cutting and matching could not have been
handled. I find nothing in the contract or in past
practice that contemplates or supports any such result.
Therefore the Union's grievance is denied.
ISSUE NO. 2
The Employer complains that on July 20th, the
Union's steward posted a notice that was designed
to instruct employees (and Union members) to defy
certain Employer actions. The Notice read:
Dear Member:
The Officers and Executive Board hereby
notify the members of 702 that during
short time there will be no temporary
transfers, no overtime, and no jobs performed by Supervisors.
Any violations of this should be reported to a Union official immediately.

-3Fraternally yours,

Steve Perdikakis
Secretary-Treasurer
The Employer also calims that on the same night
the steward (Mr. D. Mercuric) twice threatened an
Employer Supervisor, that he would order members
not to carry out work assignments if the Employer
took certain actions.
At the hearing, this Arbitrator advised the Union
that the Notice could be construed by employees as
a Union directive to defy Employer orders and work
assignments, and that it therefore violated Article
15 of the contract. The Arbitrator instructed
Steward Mercuric to call the shop and have the
Notice removed. Mercuric complied with the Arbitrator's instructions.
There was no denial of the allegations that
Mercuric threatened supervision that work assignments would not be carried out. I find that too
was a violation of Article 15 of the contract.
As a remedy, I shall reiterate what I said in my
arbitration decision of October 8, 1970, between
the Union and Deluxe General.
I make that decision
as set forth below, the concept of which I have time
and again stated is binding industry-wide,
applicable to the collective bargaining relationship between- the Union and DuArt:
An employee must perform a work assignment or an order from the Employer even
if he or the Union believes it to be in
violation of the contract or any other
agreement between the Union and the
Employer.
The right of the employee and/or the Union is
under the grievance procedure of the contract.
In other words, the employee must perform the work
assigned, subject to his right and the right of
the Union on his behalf to complain to the permanent Arbitrator, subsequent to performing the
assignment, that it is in violation of the contract,
and to seek whatever remedy or relief would be
appropriate.
The intent of this directive is to make clear to
the parties that the permanent Arbitrator believes
that work assigned and orders given must be performed and carried out by the employee so assigned
or directed whether or not in violation of the contract, subject to his right to thereafter grieve before the permanent Arbitrator.

-4The only exception to this well settled rule
is when the assignment would place the employee
in physical jeopardy or when the assignment is
illegal or unsocial.
Violations of the foregoing will justify
discharge.

DATED: August 17, 1987
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
/

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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E ISSUES were
ubetantially as

"1. IM tto trtevenee at £SJ arbitrable
under the contractf " • • •
"J. If so, did d* Company violate (to
contract in refuting him additional vacacloa MY and retirement benefits?**
The Union objected to the Inclusion of
Issue No. I. but found no fault with Issue
No. 2.
Discussion
As presented at the hearing, the basis
of the Union's obtecdon to the inclusion of
the issue of arbitrabllity was that since the
Company had participated in the grievance
orocedures set up in the contract through
and including the submission of the dispute
to arbitration, it was precluded from
raising this issue.
in the brief, filed February 22, 1968, at
page 5, the Union asserts its opposition
(to the Inclusion of Issue No. 1) in a somewhat different way. The Union position
here expressed is that the parties had mutually agreed to arbitrate the grievance
OUTSIDE THE CONTRACT.
In presenting this position the Union My*
(MM 5)
'
•
*'• .
" . . . we would have bad to agree that
our contract was not violated . . . nor
under the terms of the contract is this an
arbitrable dispute between the Company and
th« Union."
.- .. .^.. /;;<
After hearing tM parties and examining
tto exhibits tto Arbitrator must concur
In this conclusion.
There is no escape from tto fact that
[S.] was a foreman and. by its terms, excluded from the coverage of tto contract.
It is eoually inescapable that [S.'sJ grievance is not subject to tto arbitration procedures set up in tto contract.
But. savs tto Union. (1) tto Company is
precluded by its action* tram raising tto
question of arbitrabllltv. and C2) there was
* mutual agreement to arbitrate outside
tto contract. Tto parties are entitled to
tto Arbitrator's view on these points.
To accept tto first proposition we would
to required to agree that by its acquiescence in submitting tto matter to arbitration tto Company bad waived tto right to
assert In defense of its position an express
condition of tto labor contract, to-wit:
Sec. 5. Par. 3 Co. Exhibit No. 3, which
reads:
"Tto classes of employees excepted from
membership in accordance with tto Agreement are: Company executives, office.
clerical and Seles employees, superintendents, departmental foremen, chemists,
technical or professional employees, and
plant watchmen."
This would amount to a CHANGE in the
contract and fall completely outside the orLabor Affaitntdon Awards

bit of INTBUPRBTATICN of fee contract
wbtcn by mutual OOOMBC of (to pantoe la
permitted bv Sec. 21. Par. 2. Co. BxotttcS.
Tto eecooJ araoositloa »*i**ft*» in effect to tto atandonment of tto contract
and tto substitution of an undoecrlbod
agreement for tto arbitration of due dispute.
Neither of thess propositions can be
accepted. Tto contract is tto fundamental
thine: it is at the same time the basis and
the limit of the Arbitrator's authority.
His function is to "interpret and apply
THIS agreement (emphasis supplied) and he
shall have no power to add terms or provisions . . . nor to enlarge its (his ) own
Jurisdiction."
Since (S.] was not covered under the contract and with the Arbitrator's authority
limited to the contract, it follows that the
grievance Is not subject to arbitration under
the contract.
f Award)
The Finding is that tb* grievance of IS.]
Is not arbitrable under tto contract between

tto partie*.-

. •

• -

. • -

ft 8408] MOVIILAB. tNCOHPORATID
and INTBRKATIOMAL ALLIANCE
OF THEATRICAL, 8TAOK CMPLOxXXS
AND MOVING PICTORI MACHINE OPERATORS OF THB UNITED STATES AND
CANADA. LOCAL 702
JOSEPH B. MCMAHON. Arbitrator, appointed bv the parries. March 29. 1968.
Discipline—Police Record
What an emotovee does oo bis dme otL
unless it has a bed effect on the business,
is not generally a basts tor disciplinary
sctioo bv tto employer. Even violation
of the law and conviction for acts committed ouuide worklnc hours and whtie
off tto company's premises do not necesarilv constitute * proper basis for disciplinary action unless the action has an
adverse effect on employees or the business.
Termination of Employment—Police Record
Termination of an emolovee for conviction of possession of martiuans and giving
or employees and had taken piece off of
don did not adversely affect tto business
of emotoreee and tod taken piece off of
companv 'premises. Tto company also
overlooked tto fact that tto employee bed
been put on probation, rather then in (ail.
1f4Q8

43M

an Unoonant mttfcadng circumstance. The
employee w*a reinatatad wtdi fuJJ <eoo>
oeaaadon tor time loat, 3~. ,~ % •< •••*?«•>.
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Praankar. FeJdman and Gartner; to the
or
taatlmoay ,^ft <- -~_ wed employment of
Coraoanv. Nicholas Pinto. Esq.. of Pinto
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V.OTOT would
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nave any adverse
and Stein: for the Union. •
effect on Its business or Ita employeremployee relationships. One should not
[Text of Award]
minimize the seriousness of this employMcMAHON Arbitrator:
ISSUE: The
ee's conduct which la socially reprehenIssue in this case aa agreed upon by the
sible. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
parties is as follows:
examine
the principle that is applicable
Was the discharge of [A.] for lust cause;
in situations of this type.
if not. what shall the remedy be?
As a general rule, arbitrators hold to
the principle that what an employee does
on his own time and off the employer's
Background
premises unless related to or having an
The relatively few facts, not in dispute,
adverse effect
upon the employer's
are as follows: [A.], herein sometimes
business is not a proper basis for disreferred to as "employee." was employed
ciplinary action by the employer and that
by the Company from 1963 to October 31,
violation of the criminal law and having
1967 when he waa discharged. At the time
of hia discharge he waa a color printer. charges filed against him or even being
convicted of a criminal offense for acts
Company notified [A.] in writing on Octocommitted
outside working hours and while
ber 31. 1967 that be waa discharged "for
off employer's premises, doea not necescause". Ha had been.suspended on October 27. 1967. the day he waa found guilty sarily constitute a proper basis for disciplinary action unleia.there (a an adverse
rafter trial) in the County Court of Hudson
effect unon the employer-employee rela- /
/ County (New Jersey) of "poajeaaton, and
tlcmsrnp « dw employer^. bMfip«ga.tt ad- J
tivlnK narc. to a minor." Oo January 19.
1968 be waa aantaoced to be confined to veraely affected. Pearl Brewing Company.
(he New Jeraey State Prison foran?lntm.um (67-1 ARB !81561..aiiA3a7, AjH*cu«alon of this principle and the criteria for
term of two (2) years and a maximum tarrn
•ustaining a diacharge under these cirof three 13) veara. The aentence waa suscumstances la contained in WE. Caldwall
pended and [A.] waa fined $100.00 and Co..
28 LA 343.
placed on probation for three (3) years.
In
the caae of Aermodve Metal CorporaA reauest for a hearing was made by the
tion v. Infl Association of Machinists,
Union on November 24. 1967. A bearing
Lodge 93. 64-3 ARB T8898, the above prinwas scheduled for December 1, 1967 but
ciple
waa the basis for sustaining the disDoatDoned bv mutual consent of the parties
. to March 20. 1968. It waa agreed between charge of an employee, convicted of having
possession of marijuana. In addition, the
the parties that die Company waa ootreaponaible for any delay in bringing this emolovee had a ion* history of plant mUconduct and the arbitrator ruled that the
matter to a hearing subsequent t« Decemdischarge waa not upheld solely .because
ber IS. 1967.
j :
of die conviction but becauao of hia
cumulative conduct of- which dw narcotics
Company's PoaiUon
conviction waa merely diet btat incident.
The Company contends (hat the nature of
IB die caae of Oil Chemical and Atomic
the crime of which (A. j waa convicted waa
Worker a International Union and Linde
aufflcient Riatiflcadon of hia diacharge.
Company. f62-l ARB 18163]. 37 LA 1041.
we find facts similar to thoae here, hi
that caae the employee waa discharged
Union's PoaiUon
following a plea of guilty to possession
The Union contends that off-duty conof narcotics. There was an admission to
duct of this employee resulting in hia conthe uae of marltuana; a prior conviction
viction having no relationship to his
under die eame charge in another state:
employment does not conatloite "lust
and aft undesirable diacnarje from die
cauae." The act for which he waa convicted waa not committed on Company's Air Force. The arbitrator in hokJin* that
die discharge waa not Justified, observed
premises; what an employee, doea off-duty
that die Company bad cloeed Ita eyea to die
on hia dme and off Company oremiaea la
fact that the employee tad been placed on
not lustiflcation for a dlacharge. .-.
probation by goverameot atldnridea, The
1M08
© 196*. ComnaeeeOaaiinc
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l^Arbh«knAi«* Chrf-«MAMf,, v .,j*tta
arMtraeor to upsetting die dlscharga held
eodded to raced** ftottdty oar. Ontr anthat me granting of probation we* a* toployeee who wafted "the last working day''
separable element of the conviction and
before and after fee holiday «*«• eligible.
represented a determination feat the employee waa a safe and useful member of Tola could not be intarpreted to mean the
aociety. Under such circumstances the employe's laat working day, given the
bare (act of conviction did not furnlah lust ordinary moantns; of tha terms. The union
agreed that employee* on "extended" lay.
cause for discharge.
<•
off would not be entitled to such pay and the
Another Interesting decision dealing with
contract made no distinction between exthe discharge of a person convicted of a
tended and short term layoffs. Finally,
crime that waa socially objectionable is
the contract specified that employees on
Babcock & Wllcox Corp. v. The United
Steelworkers of America Local 1082 64-3 vacation would receive holiday pay. Recognizing the need to specify when this pay
ARB t8974. The arbitrator in setting
was due. the parties could have easily listaside discharge stated that even if the
ed the circumstances under which it could
emolovee's Conviction was viewed in Its
be paid to employees on layoff.
moet undesirable light, there was no re/ lationship between the offense and the employee's status as an employee.
[Text of Award]
It appears well established that each
STRONG. Arbitrator: Eight of the twencase must rest on its own facts. In this
ty-five employees of the Company's trailproceeding the Company attempts to justify
er-tractor Service Branch in Baltimore
the discharge upon the bare fact of conwere laid off by seniority on Tuesday, Noviction and Introduced no testimony or
evidence that would show or tend to show vember 21. 1967. for economic reasons.
- that the Company's reputation had been They were recalled to begin work on Noadversely affected or that fellow employees vember 27th. but did not work on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday of their
would refuse or be reluctant to work
work week and were not paid for • «ny of
with this employee. Moreover, the Comthese days. The Company had never paid
pany, aa In the Llnde case, haa overlooked
completely the probation factor. Taking Holiday Pay to employees on layoff eo
into account all of die teadmony presented did not par for the Thanksgiving Holiday
which occurred on November 23rd. It
hi thla case, I must find that the answer
baa intarpreted Article XIV of tfae Agreeto the question is In the negative and
ment to mean the plane's last Kheduled
the discharge waa not fuadflahla.
working day rather than the employee's
laat scheduled working day. No grievance
Award
has ever been filed prior to the group
The award, therefore, Is that the disgrievance herein dated November 30,
charge of [A.] waa not for just cause;
1967. but die Union's officials were unand the company la directed to reimburse
aware that holiday pay was not being paid
him In a sum equal to normal dally rate
ty'of pay for the period October 31. 1967 to employees on layoff. Article XIV reads
E to and Including December 15. 1967, less In pertinent part aa follows: .
"Section 14.01 All employees on the
any unemployment Insurance benefits reactive payroll having seniority oa . . .
ceived
by
said
employee
during
that
period.
**"..
Thanksgiving Day . . . shali be paid their
basic hourly straight-time rate* tor eight
(8) hours for such days not worked provided
the holiday falls within their normal work
week. . . .
.
II84CX5J TRAILMOanJK, DIVISION
Or
"SECTION
14.03.
The
employee must
.'
PULLMAN. mCORPORATKD and
have worked the laat scheduled working day
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
before . . . and . . . after the holiday in
'TEAMSTERS.
CHAUFFEURS, WAREorder to be eligible for payment for the
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA.
holiday. . . . "
LOCAL Sll
"Section 14.05 When the holiday falls
within the eligible employee's approved vaGEORGE B. STRONG, Arbitrator, ap- pointed by the parties. Baltimore. Mary- cation period and he is absent from work
during his regularly scheduled work week
-land. April 12. 1968.
because of such vacation, be shall be paid
for such holiday." :
; ...«-j >w i, .
The
Agreement
also
contain* the usual
•Holidays and Holiday Pay—LavQff
restriction* on any power of an arbitrator
K° Eight employees who were on layoff durVlng the Thanksgiving holiday week were not to chawee the Aareement. and recognizea
die right erf the Company to "determine the
f
IBM

VMM

60 LA 632
doea not expressly, or by Implication, forbid or restrict this right. It
seems reasonable to extend this same
principle to the learner category.
However, the Instant case differs
from the Filer case In that, In the
view of the Arbitrator, the Company
cannot, because of the provision of
Paragraph A, Section 3, Article XI,
which states: "Learner Progression
Schedules covering all Learners Included in the Bargaining Unit are
shown In Appendix D," establish new
learner titles unless the matter has
been negotiated with the Union. The
Arbitrator has no definite and certain
way of determining whether the parties, when they Included this provision in the 1956 labor agreement, Intended that new learner titles must
be negotiated. However, the Arbitrator believes that the wording of
Paragraph A can be reasonably construed to mean that the addition of
new learner titles must be negotiated.

The Union stated, and its statement was not contested, that beginning with the first contract hi 19M,
and continuing through the current
agreement, dated November 5, 1945,
the learner titles contained In Appendix D were the result of negotiating. In the I960 agreement the
learner title "Toolmaker-Wood" was
added, and in the current agreement
the learner title "Bonder-Rotor
Blades" was added.
The Arbitrator concludes, chiefly
from the negotiating history with respect to the learner category, and
from tiie wording of Paragraph A,
Section 3, Article XI, that the Company does not hare the right to unilaterally establish new learner titles.
Therefore, this Issue is remanded to
the parties for negotiation.
No compensation, as requested by
the Union at the hearing and In Its
brief, is allowed.
The Arbitrator strongly urges the
parties that, hi view of the fact that
apparently the learner category has
not posed a serious difficulty hi the
several negotiations since 19S6, and
that because the Company is engaged
in vital production for the war effort, they proceed speedily to arrive
at a mutually satisfactory settlement.
AWARD

1. The Company does not have the
unilateral right to establish new
learner titles.
2. The Issue is ramanded to the
parties for negotiation.

MOVIELAB, INC.
MOVIELAB, INC.—
Decision of Arbitrator
In re M O V I E L A B , INC. and
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS, LOCAL 702, IATSE
Case No. 67-A-33, March 29,19«8
Arbitrator: Joseph E. McMahon
DISCHARGE
—Conviction on narcotics charges—
Employer's reputation — Attitude of
fellow employees—Off-duty conduct
»118.643 » 118.634
Employer was not justified in discharging employee on basis of bare fact he
was convicted of possession of narcotics
and giving narcotics to a minor, since
employer introduced no evidence to show
that its reputation had been adversely affected or that fellow employees would refuse or be reluctant to work with employee, and employer overlooked fact that
employee had been placed on probation.
(J. McMahon) —MoYlelab, Inc., 50 LA
632.

Appearances: For the company —
Eric R o s e n f e l d (Polettl, Freidin,
Prashker, Feldman 8t Gartner), attorney. For the union — Nicholas Pinto
(Pinto & Stein), attorney.
NARCOTICS CONVICTION

McMAHON, Arbitrator:—The issue
in this case as agreed upon by the
parties is as follows:
Was tbe discharge of X— for Just
cause; if not, what shall the remedy be?

Baekfroond
The relatively few facts, not in dispute, are as follows:
X—, herein sometimes referred to
as "employee", was employed by the
Company from 1963 to October 31,
1967 when he was discharged. At the
time of his discharge he was a color
printer. Company notified X— in
writing on October 31, 1967 that he
was discharged "for cause". He had
been suspended on October 27, 1967,
the day he was found guilty (after
trial) in the County Court of Hudson
County (New Jersey) of "possession
and giving narc. to a minor". On
January 19, 1968 he was sentenced to
be confined to the New Jersey State
Prison for a minimum term of two (2)
years and a maximum term of three
(3) years. The sentence was suspended and X— was fined $100.00 and
placed on probation for three (3)
years. A request for a hearing was
made by the Union on November 24,
1967. A hearing was scheduled for
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, INC.

December 1, 1967 but postponed by
mutual consent of the parties to
March 20, 1968. It was agreed between
the parties that the Company was not
responsible for any delay in bringing
this matter to a hearing subsequent
to December 15, 1967.
Company's Position

The Company contends that the
nature of the crime of which X— was
convicted was sufficient justification
of his discharge.
Union's Position

The Union contends that off-duty
conduct of this employee resulting in
his conviction having no relationship
to his employment does not constitute "just cause". The act for which
he was convicted was not committed
on Company's premises; what an employee does off-duty on his time and
off Company premises is not justification for a discharge.
Discussion

The primary issue under the aforementioned circumstances is whether
conviction of a crime is sufficient
justification for discharge. Of major
importance is the fact that the Company introduced no evidence or testimony that continued employment of
this employee would have any adverse effect on its business or its employer - employee relationships. One
should not minimize the seriousness
of this employee's conduct which is
socially reprehensible. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to examine the principle
that is applicable in situations of this
type.
As a general rule, arbitrators hold
to the principle that what an employee does on his own time and off
the employers premises unless related
to or having an adverse effect upon
the employer's business is not a
proper basis for disciplinary action by
the employer and that violation of
the criminal law and having charges
filed against him or even being convicted of a criminal offense for acts
committed outside working hours and
while off employer's premises, does
not necessarily constitute a proper
basis for disciplinary action unless
there is an adverse effect upon the
employer-employee relationship or
the employer's business is adversely
effected. Pearl Brewing Company, 48
LA 387. A discussion of this principle
and the criteria for sustaining a discharge under these circumstances is
contained in W. E. Caldwall Co., 28
LA 343.
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In the case of Aeromotive Metal
Corporation vs. Int'l Association of
Machinists, Lodge 93 64-3 ARB. 8898,
the above principle was the basis for
sustaining the discharge of an employee, convicted of having possession
of marijuana. In addition, the employee had a long history of plant
misconduct and the arbitrator ruled
that the discharge was not upheld
solely because of the conviction but
because of his cumulative conduct of
which the narcotics conviction was
merely the last incident.
In the case of Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union
and Linde Company, 37 LA 1041, we
find the facts similar to those here.
In that case the employee was discharged following a plea of guilty to
possession of narcotics. There was an
admission to the use of marijuana; a
prior conviction under the same charge
in another state; and an undesirable
discharge from the Air Force. The
arbitrator in holding that the discharge was not justified, observed
that the Company had closed its eyes
to the fact that the employee had been
placed on probation by government
authorities. The arbitrator in upsetting
the discharge held that the granting
of probation was an inseparable element of the conviction and represented
a determination that the employee
was a safe and useful member of
society. Under such circumstances the
bare fact of conviction did not furnish
just cause for discharge.
Another interesting decision dealing
with the discharge of a person convicted of a crime that was socially
objectionable is Babcock Si Wilcox
Corp. vs. The United Steelworkers of
America Local 1082 64-3 ARB. 8974.
The arbitrator in setting aside discharge stated that even if the employee convicted was viewed in its
most undesirable light, there was no
relationship between the offense and
employee's status as an employee.
It appears well established that
each case must rest on its own facts.
In this proceeding the Company attempts to justify the discharge upon
the bare fact of conviction and introduced no testimony or evidence
that would show or tend to show that
the Company's reputation had been
adversely affected or that fellow employees would refuse or be reluctant
to work with this employee. Moreover, the Company, as in the Linde
case has overlooked completely the
probation factor. Taking into account
all of the testimony presented In this
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case, I must find that the answer to
the question Is in the negative and
the discharge was not justifiable.
AWARD

The award, therefore, is that the
discharge of X— was not for just
cause; and the company is directed to
reimburse h»m in a sum equal to
normal dally rate of pay for the
period October 31, 1967 to and including December 15, 1967, less any unemployment insurance benefits received by said employee during that
period.
CHAKDON RUBBER CO.—
Decision of Arbitrator
In re CHARDON RUBBER COMPANY [Chardon, Ohio] and RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL
557, February 26,1968

Arbitrator: David L, Kabaker
UNION REPRESENTATIVES
—Representation by steward in department other than one in which he
works * 93.22
Under contract providing that "union
representatives shall be permitted to
leave their respective jobs and/or departments when necessary for purpose
of investigating or handling grievances,'*
union has right to appoint steward as
union representative for d e p a r t m e n t
other t**fn one in which he works and
he may represent more than one department. It is illogical to conclude that
"grievance hunting" in contract refers
only to grievances that originate within
one department, despite employer's unsupported contention that consistent
pastpracttoe has been that departmental steward must be employed in department he represents. (D. Kabaker)—
Chardon Rubber Co, 60 LA 634.

Appearances: For the company—
Chester Nikodyn, attorney; Leo Breidger, personnel manager; Bruce Paepke, manufacturing manager. For me
union—-Jake Miller, International representative; Olen C. WUcoz, union
president: Lela K. Heath, union secretary; Raymond W. Fry, chief steward.
STEWARDS' JURISDICTION
The Grievance
KABAKER, Arbitrator:—The grievance reads as follows:

CHAROON RUBBER CO.
a
. occurred on Second
Shift in Department 90 on March 2
1967. Nature of Grievance: Del Clemens
is violating Article 4 (IV) Step 1 of the
grievance procedure."

The above grievance was carried
through the steps of the grievance
procedure, and the Parties being unable to resolve the dispute, selected
the undersigned to serve as Arbitrator to hear and decide the above
matter.
A hearing was held In PalnesvUle,
Lake County, Ohio, on the 28th day
of November, 1967, at which the Parties were present and were given full
opportunity to present evidence and
arguments. Thereafter, post hearing
briefs were filed on January 31, 1968,
by both Parties, which was within the
time specified at the hearing, for the
filing of the same.
Background

At the time of the instant dispute
Pearl Valvoda worked In Department
140 where she was the duly appointed
Steward, and was recognized by the
Company as the Union Representative for that department.
On February 24, 1967, the Union appointed Miss Valvoda as acting Steward in Department 90 to temporarily
fill the vacancy in the stewardship in
that department. Upon determining
that no employee hi Department 90
was willing to accept the steward
position, the Union on March 1, 1967,
thru its proper officers, appointed
Pearl Valvoda to serve as permanent
steward of Department 90 in addition
to her stewardship in Department 140.
The Company was duly notified of
Miss Valvoda's permanent appointment to the stewardship of Department 90, but declined to recognize
her as the regular steward In Department 90. Thereafter the i n s t a n t
grievance was filed, protesting the
Company's refusal to recognize Miss
Valvoda as the steward of Department
90.
The Issue
The Issue involved in the instant
grievance can be stated as follows:
"Does the Union have the right to
appoint a steward as a union representative for a department other than
the one in which he works and can
the Union appoint a steward to represent more than one department?"
Labor Agreement

The following provisions of the Labor Agreement are pertinent to the
instant dispute:

TPERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture
Laboratory Film Technicians

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Technicolor

The stipulated issue is:
Has Technicolor violated Section 9(a) of the
contract by denying overtime to a night shift
operator and by temporarily transferring an
employee into the applicable classification?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 22, 1988 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It is the Union's contention that my Avard of June 19, 1985,
in which I upheld an employer's right under the industry-wide
contract, to use temporary transfers to cover work in positive
developing, without the need to offer that work on an overtime
basis to employees in the department, was varied by a subsequent
.verbal agreement between this Company and the Union.

The Union

asserts that under the verbal agreement, the Company would first
offer the available, uncovered work to other employees in the
positive developing department on an overtime basis, and would
only use temporary transfers if the overtime offers were refused.

Cs
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The evidence shows that the arrangement the Union claims
applicable was at one time agreed to between representatives of
the parties for the printing department, and has been a
consistent practice in the negative developing department.
However, the evidence on whether there was such an agreement
applicable to the positive developing department, the situation
in the instant case, is unclear, offsetting and hence
inconclusive.

The Union testimony is that the discussions

regarding the procedure for coverage of vacant work

(resulting

from absences, vacations, etc.) went beyond the printing
department and negative developing, and included positive
developing.

The Company testimony is contrary.

It is to the

effect that the agreement was limited to the printing department
(superceded thereafter by the reclassification of an employee to
provide a regular positive developer when needed).
It is undisputed that the arrangement in the negative
developing department pre-dated the verbal discussions and is not
claimed to have been part of those talks.
The aforesaid testimony was respectively by the two persons
who held those talks, namely the Union President and the Company
Vice President-Operations.

No other testimony or evidence was

adduced to support either position.
The burden is on the grieving party, the Union, to prove its
case clearly and convincingly.

I cannot conclude that it has met

that burden, under th'ese circumstances.

I am fully satisfied

that the respective testimony was the honest recollection of both
men.

I just don't think they communicated well with regard to
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the positive development department.

Also, it seems to me under

that circumstance where misunderstanding is quite possible, that
if my prior Award and therefore the interpretation of the
contract was to be changed, some written confirmation of a matter
of that consequence should have been made.

Or it would have been

memorialized in some more probative and conclusive manner.
Therefore, while there may have been a verbal agreement to
offer overtime first before using temporary transfers in the
positive developing department, it has not been adequately proved
in this proceeding.
The Undersigned Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proof and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD.
Technicolor did not violate Section 9(a) of
the contract by denying overtime to a night
shift operator and by temporarily
transferring an employee into the applicable
classification.

Eric J r Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

/

DATED: July 26, 1988
STATE OF
New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
.Arbitrator that I am the individual described in an who executed
this instrument, which is my Award.
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